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The Supreme Court held in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid that a California
regulation mandating that union organizers have occasional access to privately
owned farms was a per se taking because it stripped the farm owners of the right to
exclude. The decision almost certainly departed from prior law, and I briefly review
some of the critiques of the majority opinion. But my focus is on questions that arise
if one accepts the Court’s conclusion that the regulation is indeed a taking: First, I
briefly discuss whether we should permit the taking so long as the owners are
compensated or enjoin the taking either because it is not “for public use” or because
compensation, a form of damages, is not an adequate remedy for losses that are
either not readily commensurable with money or are extraordinarily difficult to
measure. Second, I discuss how we should measure compensable losses and, more
particularly, whether we should compensate owners because the regulation makes
them more vulnerable to what they see as profit-reducing unionization. I note that
the fact that a plaintiff might not have sustained reputational losses absent a trespass
that gave the trespassers access to reputation-damaging information does not mean
that the damages for trespass should incorporate the damages for reputational
losses (which should instead be assessed by reference to a different “track” of law,
defamation law). What the owners in Cedar Point Nursery are entitled to is
compensation only for the loss of rights that physical takings law protects—in cases
like this of temporary access mandates, losses that inhere in having to share use of
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a portion of the property with others—and we must deal with the validity of laws
limiting the capacity to suppress unionization efforts in their own right.
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INTRODUCTION
In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (hereafter CPN),1 the Supreme
Court decided that California regulations passed pursuant to the
California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, mandating that
union organizers have access to privately owned farms, 120 days a year,
during three non-work hours, constituted a per se taking. The Court held
that the regulation took the regulated owners’ property because it stripped
them of the right to exclude, thereby constituting the sort of physical
taking that the Court first announced in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp. would require compensation.2 The Court did so
without regard to the explicit factors articulated in Penn Central
Transport Co. v. New York City3 that courts use to ascertain if a regulation
has gone “too far” in asking an owner to bear the costs of meeting a public
1 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (holding that California’s mandate that union organizers have access
to private property constituted a taking of the owner’s property).
2 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that government authorization of third-party cable company to
physically occupy a small portion of landlord’s roof to install a cable box permitting cable access
for tenants constitutes a per se taking). In his CPN dissent, Justice Breyer persuasively argues that
the regulation in Loretto appropriated the owner’s property, divesting the owner of the ability to
use or profit from the portions of the property to which the cable company was given exclusive
access, while the CPN regulation merely regulated how the owners could use their retained rights
to exclude and employ their property without substantial interference. CPN, 141 S. Ct. at 2081–83
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In his view, only appropriations are per se takings under Loretto. Id. I
largely leave this doctrinally important issue aside.
3 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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end.4 Less doctrinally, but more substantively, the Court acted without
regard to whether the regulation forced a particular owner to bear
unreasonably high costs that should be more widely borne or interfered
with aspects of control over how one’s resources are used that should be
protected.5
The decision poses a multitude of questions, and I will make but
modest reference to many of the problems in the decision that its critics
have pointed out.6 I will also attend even more briefly to the question of
4 Broadly speaking, the ad hoc balancing test articulated in Penn Central requires the court, in
deciding whether a regulation should be deemed a compensable taking, to consider: (1) The
economic impact of the regulation (comparing the value that has been taken from “the property”—
however the physical and conceptual scope of the owner’s property is defined—with its unregulated
value); (2) The degree to which the owner has already made substantial investments in reasonable
reliance on the legal regime remaining as it did before the regulation at issue in the takings case
came into effect; and (3) The character of the government action (including among other concerns
whether it is more intuitively described as harm averting or benefit conferring; whether there is a
reasonable reciprocity of advantage so that the owner gains from parallel regulations of others’
property even though the owner loses from the imposition of those regulations on her particular
property). Id. at 124–28.
I completely set aside questions of whether each of these factors is well-defined individually or
whether the Court gave adequate guidance as to how the factors ought to be balanced. For a
representative critique of the clarity of the test, see Holly Doremus, Takings and Transition, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 7 (2003) (“The Court has many times repeated the list of Penn Central
factors, but has never refined the meaning of those factors, or explained how they should be
weighted.”). I also ignore questions of whether the test is too deferential to state actions that limit
property rights without compensation. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 57 (1985) (arguing that when government diminishes “the
rights of an owner in any fashion,” there is a prima facie taking “no matter how small the
alteration”). I also set aside the claim that, from an Originalist perspective, the Penn Central test
demands compensation too often, requiring compensation outside the simple condemnation cases
that were the sole subject of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995);
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1252 (1996).
5 The uncompensated owners in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
mandated by the California Supreme Court to allow orderly political pickets and petitioners on the
shopping centers that they owned, bore far greater financial burdens than the landlord in Loretto.
In Loretto, the rental property likely increased in value when the cable boxes were installed on the
building’s roof while the presence of political speakers likely diminished shopping. Loretto, 458
U.S. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, to the degree to which owners felt their resources
were being used to subsidize speech they disapproved of, some would believe they were stripped
of a form of control over resources that is not readily commensurable with compensation and
perhaps ought to be barred altogether if one seeks to use takings law to protect non-economic
interests in ownership. Moreover, however reprehensible most of us would find a public
accommodation’s owner’s desire to exclude people on the basis of a potential customer’s race, an
owner’s desire to exclude may reflect profit-increasing motivations if many of the owner’s
customers prefer segregated environments and/or “control” motivations if the owner highly values
his ability to choose the people he will associate with, even for bad reasons. Nonetheless, the Court
in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964), readily dismisses the
takings challenge to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
6 See discussion infra Part II.
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whether the nursery owner should be entitled to enjoin the accessgranting regulation or merely be awarded monetary compensation, a
question the district court might well face on remand, although the
owners in the case initially sought only declaratory and injunctive relief,
not compensation.7
What I will focus on a bit more is a question the district court might
well have to face on remand if the state presses the point that the Fifth
Amendment protects owners against uncompensated takings for public
use, not the takings themselves: how to measure just compensation in this
case. The critical point I will pursue is that it would be inappropriate
simply to ascertain and compensate for all the losses the owner bears as
a result of the regulation. We should make sure that we do not use takings
law to protect economic interests that we have rightly decided are not
worthy of protection, either through takings law or outside of it. In
reaching this conclusion, I draw on analogies from other areas of law. For
instance, it is appropriate to protect only certain interests that a landowner
has against what might be considered technical trespasses, even when the
economic losses borne that could be said to be caused by these putative
trespasses may be considerably more extensive than the properly
compensable ones.8 Similarly, it is inappropriate to defeat a defendant’s
claim that her use of copyrighted material was a fair use by noting that
she caused a high level of economic harm to the copyright holder, rather
than that she harmed a narrower set of economic interests appropriately
protected through copyright law.9 I will briefly argue, further, that the
properly compensable losses in this case are likely to be trivial,10 though
perhaps not as trivial as the lower courts found them to be in the canonical
Loretto case.11

7

See discussion infra Part III.
In this regard, I will draw heavily on Judge Posner’s thoughtful opinion in Desnick v.
American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
9 In this regard, I will draw heavily on judicial opinions in cases such as SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
10 See discussion infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
11 On remand, lower courts approved and ratified decisions made under New York’s statutory
scheme to provide just $1 in compensatory damages. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV, 446 N.E.2d 428, 434–35 (N.Y. 1983). This seems sensible at first blush since the value of
the landlord’s building almost surely increased when the cable company installed a cable box
facilitating access. Of course, though, the apartment owners could argue that what was taken from
them when their exclusion right was taken was the ability to extract economic rents from the cable
company: landlords had monopoly power over access to customers. This view of the landlord’s
loss is supported in Richard A. Epstein, The Unfinished Business of Horne v. Department of
Agriculture, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 734, 754–55 (2016). In the discussion infra text
accompanying notes 64–66, I argue that the interest in extracting monopoly profits arising from a
natural monopoly that the landlords in Loretto had, like most of the economic interests that the
nursery owners have in CPN, is precisely the sort of interest not properly protected by the just
compensation mandate.
8
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I. SOME STANDARD CRITIQUES OF THE CPN DECISION
Most of the critiques of CPN focus either on whether the Court’s
efforts to distinguish the case from PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins
or Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States are successful; whether the
ways in which the cases might indeed be distinguishable are meaningful
or merely expose the substantive hollowness of treating either
exclusion/physical appropriation cases differently than use regulations;
or whether the holding in the case dictates (or at least modestly
foreshadows) problematic rulings that would require the government to
pay compensation when it sends inspectors (e.g. health and safety or
environmental enforcement inspectors) on to private property.
Property owners in both PruneYard and Heart of Atlanta Motel were
certainly stripped of the legal privilege to exclude persons that they
desired to exclude (political protesters; non-White potential customers
respectively). How might one differentiate the cases from CPN?12 And
why might the distinctions seem problematic, either because they cannot
be administered in a sensible or predictable fashion or in the sense that
the distinctions, even if discernible enough to predict outcomes, are
substantively empty—differentiating situations along dimensions that
ought to be of no moment?
One might argue that the owners in both PruneYard and Heart of
Atlanta did not seek to exclude persons generally from entering their
It is worth noting that one might argue that we ought not to think of the government as taking
property at all when properly compensable losses are sufficiently trivial. Joseph William Singer,
Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 643 (2015).
12 See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding
that in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the federal government did not owe compensation to a
motel owner forbidden from excluding potential customers on the basis of race); PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that California is permitted to mandate that
shopping center owners allow peaceful, non-disruptive picketing and leafleting on their premises
without compensating the owners). The CPN court overrules, rather than distinguishes, PruneYard
on one issue. The PruneYard majority relied to some considerable extent on the fact that the state
authorized merely temporary, rather than permanent, third-party use and occupancy of some of the
parcel owner’s property. Id. at 78, 83–85. The CPN majority still attends to temporal duration in
drawing a distinction between a compensable taking and a trespass, subject to tort suits (depending
on sovereign immunity rules) but not constitutionally-mandated compensation for a taking. CPN,
141 S. Ct. 2063, 2078 (2021) (“Isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted
right of access, are properly assessed as individual torts rather than appropriations of a property
right.”). But the majority is willing to find a taking even when, as in CPN itself, the authorized third
parties do not have continuous, perpetual access. Id. at 2080. Questions about when intrusions are
sufficiently isolated that the owner can only invoke trespass law may indeed prove difficult as are
questions about the consequences of making the distinction. See, for example, Justice Breyer’s
dissent, reflecting on the question of whether the majority would find that a public-school bus
letting kids off to picnic on private property several times a year would be trespassing or have taken
the property. Id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts,
and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193 (2017).

134

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

property and the governmental regulations at issue (merely?) sought to
bar the owners from banning invitees on the basis of their identity or the
uses that the invitees would make of the property. By contrast, in the
majority’s view, CPN generally maintained a robust right to exclude,
inviting in only people to perform a narrow set of functions.13
But of course, one can readily describe the CPN owners as inviting
a wide range of strangers (e.g. workers, suppliers), such that they would
not be said to have the sorts of privacy-protecting, anti-intrusion interests
that, say, a homeowner would have, and argue that the CPN owners were
acting to exclude solely on the basis of something akin either to the
identity of the invitees (union organizers barred, not those delivering
alternative political messages) or, even more plausibly, the use they
intended to make (labor organizing, not supplying inputs for the nursery
business). Or, conversely, one can say that the owners in PruneYard
sought to issue a limited invitation rather than to open the shopping center
to all comers: we want shoppers, browsers, and mall rats, but not those
who have come to engage in political speech, particularly because
political speakers may suppress shopping.
Determining when an entity is sufficiently open to the public to
permit this sort of regulation without compensation will plainly pose
serious administrative challenges even if one ignores the degree to which
it is a substantively irrelevant basis to distinguish among fundamentally
commercial enterprises. If CPN had a small retail store or wholesale
showroom on the premises, would that have been enough to change the
result? Are a nursery’s suppliers the sort of limited invitees who do not
count as members of the public generally that the Court has in mind if
they come only by appointment, and do they lose that status and become
more like the members of the public who come to the mall if they come
at unscheduled times?
The Court notes that an owner has no right to demand compensation
when the state’s regulation “merely asserts a preexisting limitation upon
an owner’s title.”14 The Court here is drawing on its decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,15 in which the Court noted that a
regulation that wiped out the entire economic value of an owner’s parcel
by requiring him to abate a nuisance would not constitute a taking, even
though it had wiped out all economic value, because the owner never had
the right to create a nuisance in the first instance.16 The Lucas background
principles/nuisance exception that the CPN court carries forward has two
13 The Court states that “[l]imitations on how a business generally open to the public may treat
individuals on the premises are readily distinguishable from regulations granting a right to invade
property closed to the public.” CPN, 141 S. Ct. at 2077.
14 Id. at 2079.
15 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
16 Id. at 1030.
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plausible interpretations in my view. The first is, as dissenters in both
Lucas and CPN noted, both extraordinarily difficult to apply and subject
to the charge that utilizing it invokes the specter of unwarranted
imposition of judicial policy predilections.17 The second interpretation is
somewhat more defensible, but it is fairly plainly inapplicable to the
owners in CPN.
The first interpretation I would proffer is that the supposed preexisting limits on exclusion or use rights are the only apt limits to account
for because they have the historical pedigree that entitles committed
Burkeans to believe they are wise or because the Court has concluded that
these well-pedigreed limits are the only ones consistent with pre-political
natural rights. In this view, the owner is protected from value-destroying
regulation unless the regulation merely imposes justified limits on his use
rights, and the only justified limits are these long-recognized ones.
Any rule that respects pre-existing limits is difficult to apply both
because the content of historically established limits is difficult to
discern,18 and, more importantly, because it is not clear how long a limit
on rights has to be established (or by whom?) before it qualifies as a preexisting limit. Is Title II of the 1964 Civil Right Act (or the older-still
state antidiscrimination laws that preceded it) old enough now that limits
on discriminatory exclusion would count as pre-existing if there were a
2022 Heart of Atlanta challenge? Are the nearly fifty-year-old legislative
limits set by the state of California to exclude farm union organizers preexisting enough? And if the Court is fixated, consciously or not, on the
distinction between legislative and judicially imposed limits, would we
consider limits on the reach of trespass law imposed by the New Jersey
court in the 1971 case of State v. Shack,19 pre-existing limits on the right
to exclude? 20

17 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); CPN, 141 S. Ct. at 2089 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
18 See Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents, Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (No. 20-107) (noting a wide range of historically
recognized but shifting limits on rights to exclude (e.g. communal grazing rights; rights to enter
lands up to high tide line; overflight rights)).
19 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (forbidding the use of trespass law to bar Legal Aid attorneys from
coming on owner’s lands to advise migrant workers living on that privately owned land).
20 The dissenters in Lucas noted that Justice Scalia did little to clarify the status of “preexisting” principles that limit an owner’s rights that did not arise from common law nuisance
judicial opinions but from both other bodies of common law property adjudication and from
legislation. In the quarter century after the case was decided, lower courts frequently rejected
takings claims finding that use-limiting “background principles” precluded the claims, even when
the background principles did not arise from common law nuisance decisions. For a far fuller
discussion of both the ambiguities in the initial decision, the dissenters’ objections, and the behavior
of post-Lucas courts, see Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background
Principles in Nuisance Law, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165 (2019).
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And, of course, if the idea is that there is some set of identifiable
pre-existing rights that get the balance between access and exclusion
claims or use and immunity claims just right, we face obvious problems
of judicial overreach and the illegitimate translation of the ideological
preferences of some set of common law judges into immutable legal
rules. Justice Blackmun made that point forcefully in his dissent in
Lucas21 as does Justice Breyer in his CPN dissent.22
The nuisance exception in Lucas might, however, be defended not
because judges in bygone nuisance cases had special insight into what
uses should be protected and which banned as a substantive matter, but
because only owners who expected to make uses that were already barred
by pre-existing law were at fault for purchasing the property for more
than it is worth in its regulated state. In that sense, the pre-existing law
exception is meant to distinguish cases in which an owner reasonably
relied on her property having a particular level of value that was wiped
out by regulation she should not have been expected to anticipate and
those in which the owner simply overpaid for the property and now seeks
to be insured against her own bad decisions. This second argument is
quite problematic on its own terms: it is hardly clear in the Lucas context
that an owner who does not see restrictive environmental legislative
regulation coming is any more reasonable in his purchasing decisions
than one who does not see how a nuisance suit might be resolved if he
engages in his favored activity. But even if one is persuaded by this
version of the argument generally, it would not help the owners in CPN
because they did not, and likely could not, allege that they (or their
predecessors in interest) paid a substantial premium for the parcel relying
on the ability to exclude labor organizers.
In attempting to defend the decision from what even the majority
seem to see as an unwanted result—that it would demand that
government compensate owners if government inspectors were granted
the privilege to enter an owner’s property to check for health, safety, or
environmental violations—the majority argue that these inspections
would not require compensation because the right to inspect would be a
21 “Even more perplexing, however, is the Court’s reliance on common-law principles of
nuisance in its quest for a value free takings jurisprudence. In determining what is a nuisance at
common law, state courts make exactly the decision that the Court finds so troubling when made
by the South Carolina General Assembly today: They determine whether the use is
harmful. . . . There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. . . . If judges in the 18th
and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm from a benefit, why not judges in the 20th century, and
if judges can, why not legislators?” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054–55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 “[The majority says that] a court must focus on ‘traditional common law privileges to access
private property.’ [But] what are they? . . . Do only those exceptions that existed in, say, 1789
count? Should courts apply those privileges as they existed at that time, when there were no union
organizers? Or do we bring some exceptions (but not others) up to date, e.g., a necessity exception
for preserving animal habitats?” CPN, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2088–89 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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valid “condition” that the government demands in exchange for the
gratuitous privilege to engage in regulated activity.23 If one makes the
majority’s argument broad enough—everyone who is allowed to operate
a business has surrendered rights to be free from reasonable inspection in
exchange for that privilege to operate—then the conditional benefit line
of cases proves too much. The Court in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture specifically rejects the idea that the “privilege” to engage in
a generally legal business is the sort of special governmental permit or
privilege that might justify an uncompensated exaction, a surrender of a
property interest that would correct the “problems” caused by permitting
the activity.24 And while it is true that some businesses that are subject to
inspection require special licenses to operate, in the same way that the
Nollans required a specifically granted building permit, inspectors
frequently inspect land that is not operated under permit.25
By relying on the line of cases that differentiate breaches of the right
to exclude (which may or may not be fully coterminous with cases in
which the state appropriates property),26 the Court continued to distract
23 Id. at 2079 (“[T]he government may require property owners to cede a right of access as a
condition of receiving certain benefits . . . .When the government conditions the grant of a benefit
such as a permit, license, or registration on allowing access for . . . inspections, both the nexus and
rough proportionality requirements of the constitutional conditions framework should not be
difficult to satisfy.”). The constitutional conditions framework is first applied to takings law in
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding that the state could not demand
that the owner surrender an easement to cross the dry sand adjacent to its coastal property in
exchange for a building permit because the easement to be exacted bore no nexus to the problem
that development would cause but noting that had the state instead seized a viewing easement on
the property, it would have been permissible because doing so would have made up for otherwise
lost views of the ocean that development caused). The CPN majority cites both Nollan and Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a permit condition must not only serve the
same purpose as a permit refusal would have served but that there must be “rough proportionality”
between what is exacted and the impact of the permitted activity).
24 576 U.S. 351, 365–66 (2015). “Selling produce in interstate commerce, although certainly
subject to reasonable government regulation, is similarly not a special governmental benefit that
the Government may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection.” Id.
at 366.
25 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(3) (permitting inspection of any place where hazardous
material is stored, may have been released, or where there is a hazardous waste threat). The Court
arguably used the exactions cases not to highlight the fact that inspectors should be allowed to enter
property without compensating owners because the exclusion privilege is exchanged for a license
or permit but simply because it is exchanged for a government-provided benefit. CPN, 141 S. Ct.
at 2079–80. That seems a very weak argument: the nursery owners may (or may not) have been
given the benefit of a regime guaranteeing higher levels of labor/management cooperation when
they “surrender” the ability to bar folks on to their land who would make workers’ decisions about
unionization seem more procedurally fair.
26 See discussion supra note 2. The historical argument for sharpening the distinction between
cases involving appropriations (that ought to give rise to per se compensation obligations) and cases
simply involving physical invasion/limits on exclusion rights that should, like other “police power”
exercises be treated as regulations (that should not be per se takings) is carefully laid out in Jessica
L. Ashbridge, Redefining the Boundary Between Appropriation and Regulation, 47 BYU L. REV.
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attention from the relevant substantive question: should either the owner
or the state, as a matter of course, find use regulation any more or less
troubling than exclusion regulation?
Professor Michael McConnell argues that the state must be
restrained more (by requiring compensation) when it chooses to
appropriate rather than regulate because it will always be more tempted
to grab property that it can (re)distribute to favored constituents rather
than merely limit what an owner can do with her own property.27 He
makes this argument in the context of defending the Horne decision that
he had litigated.28 The government would be far less prone to stop farmers
from producing or selling raisins (the deferentially reviewed regulatory
method of supply-reducing cartelization, to put it in negative terms, or
the preservation of industries with high average cost/very low marginal
cost structures to put it more positively) than to seize raisins, which would
be attractive not only if in the interests of the rent-seeking/industryprotecting farmers but attractive because the raisins could be distributed
to other favored constituencies.29
Even if this were marginally true in Horne itself—and how
incremental the change in the government’s motive to act would have
been depends on the relative weight of its motive to support crop prices
compared to the desire to distribute food to schoolchildren or foreign aid
programs—it is hardly a general feature distinguishing use regulation
from “appropriation.” This has seemed obvious both to those on the
Right, like Richard Epstein, who favor more aggressive policing of
regulation,30 and those who are far more skeptical that there is a coherent
set of starting place entitlements that permit us to identify when
constitutional property rights are breached. If the state is trying to satisfy
demands by those seeking to reduce development density (whether to
increase the value of their already-developed properties or out of otherregarding environmental sentiments) it does so just as well through use
regulation as through condemnations to convert previously developable
809 (2022). I find her arguments that one can apply the distinctions she believes exist to any of the
cases that have actually turned on making the distinction unpersuasive, and her normative argument
that the distinctions matter, even if administrable, even weaker. But I leave those disagreements
aside because Ashbridge herself remains unsure which side of the line CPN (and Loretto) falls on,
because the contested state rules in each case can (but need not) be described as efforts to regulate
how the owner serves already-invited employees and tenants respectively. Id. at 855–56.
27 Michael McConnell, The Raisin Case, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 313 (2015).
28 See id. at 318–20.
29 I believe that the Court’s statements in Horne that a regulation forbidding sale or limiting
production should be reviewed more deferentially in terms of compensation obligations than the
seizure of “excess” raisins was wrong and demonstrated a deep misunderstanding of the Nollan
decision. I explore my criticisms of this aspect of Horne in Mark Kelman, Untangling Horne;
Resuscitating Nollan, 104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 50 (2018).
30 His skepticism about the distinctions Professor McConnell (and Chief Justice Roberts in
Horne itself) chose to draw is set out in Epstein, supra note 11, at 750–55.
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property to open space. If the state is trying to transfer housing resources,
in-kind, to disadvantaged renters, it does so just as well through
regulatory rent control as through using the condemnation power to
acquire land for low-cost housing development. And, ironically perhaps,
in CPN itself, if the state’s goal is to give a goodie to politically favored
unions, it can do so far more readily by taking actions that force owners
to allow union organizers to be able to interact with workers that are at
worst at the border of use regulation, than to appropriate the nursery
owner’s property outright. If the state had engaged in more unambiguous
appropriative conduct, seizing some of the nursery’s property and
declaring it the “Union Organizer Speaking Place,” the nursery could
still, absent further regulation, have taken steps to ensure workers did not
come anywhere near the government-owned physical parcel.31
II. INJUNCTION VERSUS COMPENSATION: OF PUBLIC USE AND THE
INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES
Under the deferential “public use” tests articulated by the majority
in Kelo v. City of New London,32 it is plain that the taking, if it is indeed
a taking, in CPN would meet the public use requirement and therefore
merely be compensable, rather than barred. The state’s action would be
in furtherance of a plan to further a “public purpose” and that would be
that.33 It seems equally clear to me that were today’s Court to decide a
case like Kelo, it would adopt Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in the
case, arguing that the state has not condemned property for public use
(and therefore cannot proceed with the condemnation) unless postcondemnation, the property is “owned” by the state or an entity with
common carrier obligations.34

31 I discuss further implications of this observation in more detail. See infra text accompanying
notes 59–60.
32 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
33 Id. at 483–84. It is unimportant in this context to figure out whether the Kelo majority
actually adopted what political scientists might dub a pluralist view of public purpose—the “public”
is (and cannot logically be thought of as anything but) the aggregation of individual private
purposes (because only individuals have purposes) so that the taking is justified even if it merely
seeks to increase the welfare of a particular group of workers, without regard to its impact on
consumers, producers, or those workers who would prefer the odds of unionization to decline. It is
possible as well that the Court would have felt bound to describe the public purposes in vaguer,
universal-sounding policy-aspirational fashion: the taking was designed to “promote labor peace.”
34 Id. at 508–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas’s test is ambiguous in many ways,35 and ill-conceived as a
policy matter in still more ways,36 but in thinking about CPN, only one
ambiguity matters: Did Thomas consider whether the public use
requirement as he understood it applies not just to condemnations but to
regulatory takings in which others are either granted use rights or merely
benefit from the curtailment of another’s use, disposition, or exclusion
rights (arguably the case in, for example, zoning, restrictive
environmental regulation, rent control, disability accommodation
requirements, perpetuities reforms that wipe out reversion interests that
would have vested had the traditional rule remained in force or reforms
limiting the life of defeasible fees)?
To the degree that he would forbid the taking unless there is
something like public (or common carrier) ownership of the benefits of
that taking, I am skeptical that the purported taking in CPN should be
permitted under his test. Only a small subset of the public (union
organizers) gains a right as a result of the regulation. Read this way,
though—and I am not really sure how to read Justice Thomas on this
issue—a wide swath of regulatory takings should be barred, not merely
subject to compensation duties. Only tenants benefitted by rent control
directly gain anything from the controls or could be said to own the
landlord’s taken freedom of disposition; only those whose use of public
accommodations is facilitated by accommodation requirements directly
use the facilitative accommodations;37 and, even more obviously, only
35 I have highlighted some of the ambiguities in Mark Kelman, The Conceptual Conundrum at
the Core of the Kelo Dissent, 16 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 135–39 (2021). Among
other problems, it is impossible to determine what public “ownership” means, particularly when
private parties may be bound (contractually or in fact) to use state-seized property in particular
ways; equally impossible to determine when property is truly employed by the public, given
heterogeneity among members of the public in their interest in and capacity to access or benefit
from nominally “public” property.
36 Id. at 150–69. The test is grounded in a profound misunderstanding of the functional nature
of takings. Condemnations (alongside conventional monetary taxes and regulations) are simply
ways of mustering the resources that the state controls (directly, by taxing-and-spending or
condemning-and-using, or indirectly, by regulating-and-directing). Constitutional takings law
distinguishes compensable from non-compensable governmental actions to ensure that this power
to garner resources is exercised so that no one is singled out to contribute an unfair share of
resources to government projects. “Public use” doctrine, on the other hand, at its core regulates the
(functional) “spending” power. It attempts to limit the ways in which the resources garnered
through condemnation, a quasi-tax, are expended, regulating whether these resources are used on
adequately public, rather than inappropriately parochial, projects. For a host of compelling reasons,
courts do not scrutinize conventional spending programs to guarantee that they are adequately
“public.” Supporters of the strict view of the public use requirement offer no persuasive functional
reasons to believe that it is any more sensible for courts to try to fix the judicially unfixable,
conceptually muddy problem of unwarranted parochialism when resources are garnered through
eminent domain rather than taxation or regulation.
37 This is true even if one believes, as I do, that many accommodations most useful to a
particular named beneficiary class help others. A standard example is that sidewalk cutouts aid not
only those using wheelchairs to meet mobility needs but also those wheeling around kids in
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those whose property is unencumbered when old possibilities of reverter
get wiped out directly own the taken property. Think also about right-tofarm laws that at least arguably take the immunity rights of potential
plaintiffs in nuisance suits: the use rights that the farmers gain when
potential plaintiffs are stripped of immunity rights are owned by the
farmers, not by the public generally or a common carrier. If we
conceptualize the farmers as gaining an easement through the legislation
(the right to create a nuisance), that easement, too, is privately owned.38
One could also imagine that courts hostile to regulations will choose,
going forward, to enjoin regulations that interfere with property rights
whose value is not seen as commensurable with money (or perhaps
merely extraordinarily difficult to compute).39 For instance, if the
shopping center owners in cases like PruneYard were bothered above all
by being forced “to use their own property” to help those they find
morally or politically repugnant to spread their message, a court might
find that compensation grounded simply in the decline in the market
value of the property caused by the presence of unwanted political
speakers did not really meet the legitimate interests of those whose
property would be taken, and that the only way of vindicating those
interests would be to enjoin the regulatory taking entirely.40

strollers. It is still not the case that, say, the widened aisle in a store is owned by the state or its
benefits “directly used” by all members of the public.
38 For a case finding that the right-to-farm laws indeed took the would-be nuisance plaintiff’s
rights, effectively granting an easement to farm operators to create a nuisance, see Bormann v.
Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
39 One way of thinking about the incommensurability issue is to consider an owner who finds
the speakers’ messages morally intolerable. If we asked the owner whether she would tolerate the
speech occurring on her property for $2x rather than $x, she might sincerely reply that the
distinctions in proposed compensation level had literally no impact on her willingness to tolerate
their speech.
40 There are plainly cases outside the takings domain where courts use injunctive or quasiinjunctive remedies because they think damages inadequate to protect an interest that is either not
wholly financial or well-measured simply by looking to shifts in market value: (1) Co-owners may
successfully resist judicial sale in favor of partition in kind because, given their sentimental
attachment to the co-owned land, the court may believe that receiving their proportionate share of
the market price of the property would be an inadequate remedy. See, e.g., Ark Land Co. v. Harper,
599 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 2004). (2) Future interest holders were historically able to enjoin
ameliorative waste, absent contractual terms giving greater freedom of action to present interest
holders, in part on the supposition that their desire to receive a particular parcel in a particular form
is worthy of protection. For a discussion of the traditional rule and its modern displacement, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property
Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055 (2011). (3) Courts may order specific performance of contractual
promises in cases in which money damages are thought be to be inadequate either because it is
difficult to compute loss (assessing the cost of “substitutes” is difficult) or because losses are not
readily commensurable with money. For a good, brief discussion of these distinct arguments for
specific performance, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 779, 843–47 (1994).
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III. WHICH ECONOMIC LOSSES SHOULD BE COMPENSATED?
If we assume that the access-mandate constitutes a taking and that it
will not be enjoined but permitted so long as the state provides just
compensation for the regulatory taking, how should we measure just
compensation? In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the majority did
not address the remedies issue but stated that on remand, “California
should have the choice of foreclosing injunctive relief by providing
compensation.”41
But Justice Breyer did not address the most critical conceptual
question the lower courts must face if addressing the compensation issue.
If, as is almost surely the case, the decline in the market value of the
property resulting from the regulation comes in part (or almost in whole)
from the fact that the regulation makes the owner more vulnerable to what
employers/owners perceive as profit-reducing unionization,42 should the
owner be compensated for the entire economic loss, or is the just
compensation due to an owner only for some narrower set of losses that
the prohibition on uncompensated takings is suited to protect against?43
Can we distinguish between non-compensable economic losses and
compensable ones? If the owners’ real complaint here is that the state is
facilitating union organizing, is the complaint any different than it would
be if they had challenged regulations that had no relationship to real
property, each of which would have been adjudicated under far different
legal standards? If an employer whose employees worked off-site is
mandated to share contact information for all workers eligible to vote in
a certification election with union organizers, that might or might not be
legally problematic (it might be troubling because we might think the
workers merit legal redress for their loss of privacy). But it would
certainly not be problematic because the regulation breached the owners’

41

CPN, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2089 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
I leave aside long-standing debates about whether unionization actually suppresses profits
by suppressing labor market competition and thus raising wages or increases profits by providing
efficiency-enhancing collective goods. Anti-union employers clearly perceive that unionization is
not in their economic self-interest. For the classic discussion, emphasizing the less intuitive
efficiency gains associated with unionization, see RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF,
WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984).
43 I set aside issues we would have to face if we did deem the losses that (arguably) occurred
from increasing the odds of unionization compensable. One would have to calculate how likely
unionization would be to succeed without the on-site access versus how likely it would be to
succeed with the access (neither number presumably being 100%) and then multiply the loss in
profits (and determining lost profits would require courts to intercede in the debates over the impact
of unionization I mentioned in supra note 42 that they are not likely to be competent to resolve).
Must we also determine how likely organizers are to avail themselves of access to determine the
compensation that is owed, or should we treat each occasion on which the organizers enter as its
own taking?
42
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purportedly sacrosanct right to exclude physically or block
appropriations. And, if we compensate owners for the precise same injury
that they would suffer if forced to share email lists when they do not get
compensation for whatever economic injury that unionization-facilitating
regulation may cause, we should rightly worry that we are adjudicating a
claim that “belongs” in the bucket of assessing regulations that facilitate
what the state sees as fair union certification battles in a bucket that has
little or nothing to do with the injury they actually suffer.
In thinking about the potential mismatch between injury level and
injury type, it is tremendously instructive to consider Desnick v. American
Broadcasting Cos.44 In the case, the plaintiff ophthalmic clinic (and
several clinic employees) sued the defendant TV reporters for trespass,
arguing that they assented to the reporters’ entry into their establishment
only because the reporters misrepresented their intentions (which were
predominantly to expose the clinic for doing unneeded cataract surgery
on Medicare-eligible patients).45 The key to understanding Judge
Posner’s dismissal of the trespass claim is that one must, in assessing the
propriety of granting a trespass remedy, look not to the generic features
of trespass but to the legally cognizable interests that trespass law is
bound to protect. Posner acknowledges that a defendant may well be a
trespasser if he elicits assent (what he calls “express consent”) to his
presence on the plaintiff’s property by misrepresenting his intentions,46
but emphasizes that an action in trespass should be used only to vindicate
a particular narrower set of interests, not the full panoply of economic
losses that the putative trespass may have facilitated.47 The real injury in
this case to the plaintiffs was the injury they incurred because the report
on their activities damaged their reputation (and perhaps subjected them
to criminal investigation or civil suit). But that injury, though
economically substantial, must be adjudicated according to the fairly

44

44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1347–49 (reporters’ intentions are to expose the clinic), 1351 (“The Desnick Eye
Center would not have agreed to the entry of the test patients into its offices had it known they
wanted eye examinations only in order to gather material for a television expose of the
Center . . . .”).
46 “To enter upon another’s land without consent is a trespass. . . . [T]here can be no implied
consent in any nonfictitious sense of the term when express consent is procured by a
misrepresentation or a misleading omission.” Id. at 1351. Among the examples he highlights are a
defendant who poses as a meter reader to gain entry into a home that he is simply curious to enter
or a defendant who poses as a doctor’s assistant to witness a birth. Id. at 1352.
47 “There was no invasion in the present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of
trespass seeks to protect. The test patients entered offices that were open to anyone . . . . The
activities of the offices were not disrupted . . . . Nor was there any ‘inva[sion of] a person’s private
space,’ . . . it was not an interference with the ownership or possession of land.” Id. at 1352–53
(alteration in original).
45

144

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

elaborate defamation rules we have collectively established to deal with
reputation-damaging conduct.48
Desnick may be an administratively easier case to handle than CPN
because Posner readily finds that the plaintiff sustained no damages that
trespass law is designed to protect against and thus dismisses the trespass
claim entirely.49 But there is every reason to believe that Judge Posner
would have thought it appropriate to assess damages for trespass that
made no reference to the losses that occurred because of the trespassfacilitated gathering and publication of reputation-damaging content had
he believed there were in fact some trespass damages. The task in CPN
might well be more administratively complex because it seems most
credible to believe that some of the losses the owners experience are
properly compensable because they are the sort of protect-againstproperty-intrusion losses that takings law is indeed designed to protect
against, while other economic losses are losses that arise from increasing
vulnerability to unionization.
Although specifying which losses an owner bears are compensable
and which are not when all we may most readily observe is that the value
of the owner’s interests have diminished may be difficult, it is a task
courts face in other settings. For instance, in fair use cases, courts believe
themselves capable of distinguishing injuries that the copyright regime is
designed to protect against from losses that should be adjudicated under
a distinct set of legal rules in situations in which the copyright holding
plaintiff arguably sustains both sorts of losses.50 The fourth factor in
determining whether the defendant has made a fair use of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work under § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act demands that
we attend to the (economic) impact that the infringing fair user’s work
will have on the market for or value of the copyrighted work.51 But in
many cases in which a putative fair user appropriates a significant portion
of the copyrighted work to produce a parody, the copyright holder could
48 The plaintiffs in Desnick in fact also did sue for defamation. Among the complex,
defamation-regime-specific issues associated with that aspect of the suit include questions about
which reputation-damaging actions could reasonably be attributed from defendants’ speech to
which plaintiffs and whether a single untrue reputation-harming statement is actionable if it does
not diminish reputation any more than the true (and therefore defamation-law-protected) statements
do. Id. at 1349–51. But if we simply measure all of the economic loss that would not have occurred
but-for what might be deemed a trespass, we will have adjudicated the substantive claim using the
wrong bucket of rules, obliterating all of the qualifications we have put into place that tailor our
approach to reputation-damaging speech.
49 Judge Posner concludes, “the entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of
interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference with the
ownership or possession of land. We need not consider what if any difference it would make if the
plaintiffs had festooned the premises with signs forbidding the entry of testers or other snoops.
Perhaps none . . . but that is an issue for another day.” Id. at 1353.
50 See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
51 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
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be economically damaged both because people may treat the parody as a
substitute for the original and because the parody, a form of critique of
the copyrighted work, makes potential buyers of the copyrighted work
disdain it. Copyright law protects against the injuries from market
substitution for the original or suppression of the market for derivative
works—in fact, the prototypical copyright violation consists of simply
reproducing the copyrighted work and selling it at the (low) cost of
reproduction, undercutting the copyright holder’s ability to charge
monopoly prices—but does not protect against what might be more
significant economic losses that occur because the copyrighted work is
seen by consumers as less desirable once they have confronted the critical
parody.52 Thus, in SunTrust Bank,53 injuries arising from possible market
substitution or suppression of the derivative market would be cognizable
in determining whether the appropriation of significant elements of Gone
With the Wind by the author of The Wind Done Gone was or was not a
fair use of the appropriated elements, but the suppression of demand for
Gone With the Wind that might result from the critique of the book’s
sentimentalization of slavery and the white planter class would not be.54
Again, whatever protections a copyright holder does or does not have
against the economic injuries that arise from effective critique must be
judged in accord with the (highly speaker-protective) regime governing
defamation and First Amendment-protected speech.
But consider cases in which we determine that both market
substitution and effective critique economic effects are present: perhaps
most typically, this might occur with parodies of songs by artists like
Weird Al Yankovic which are sufficiently well-produced musical
reproductions of the parodied songs that some consumers would find it
duplicative to buy the original once they have purchased the parody. A
court evaluating a fair use claim in such cases cannot merely look at the
aggregate impact of the defendant’s work on the plaintiff’s economic
interest but must do its best to determine if the losses attributable to
market substitution standing alone are sufficient to (help) defeat the fair
use claim. To do so of course requires disaggregating the losses in just
the same way one might do in Desnick and must almost surely do in CPN.
In CPN, the losses attributable to increased vulnerability to
unionization should be adjudicated simply as an aspect of the (state or
federal) regime designed to ensure fair contests over unionization, a
52

See generally SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id.
54 Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593, the SunTrust court
noted: “[T]he only harm to derivatives that need concern us . . . is the harm of market substitution.
The fact that a parody may impair the market for derivative uses by the very effectiveness of its
critical commentary is no more relevant under copyright law [than] the like threat to the original
market.” SunTrust at 1274.
53
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regime that frequently increases employer vulnerability to unionization,
in the same way that Desnick’s substantial economic losses should be
adjudicated under defamation law and the copyright holder’s reputational
losses under critique-protective First Amendment/defamation regimes. It
is possible of course that we would decide that the “vulnerability” losses
that result from forcing physical access are less tolerable or reasonable
for employers to bear than equivalent economic losses that arise from
other requirements that may aid unionization efforts (e.g. requirements
that employers not give anti-unionization speeches to “captive
audiences” of employees forced to attend the speeches within twenty-four
hours of a union election;55 requirements that employers share names and
contact information for employees who will vote on unionization).56
I largely set aside a point that might well be determinative for lower
courts in CPN: just compensation law across the board is unreceptive to
claims of consequential losses that do not arise directly from the fact that
the property owner has lost a generic property interest but arise instead
from the higher losses that result from the fact that he had made a
particular use of his property right. Losses are typically measured by
reference to the objective losses that most owners of the property right
would sustain (and these are what the government gained when it
appropriated the right) rather than the subjective losses borne by a
particular owner.57
When an owner raises concerns specific to takings law access
requirements (e.g., hedonic losses that arise from compromised privacy;
economic losses arising from diminished ability to charge potential
customers for access; hedonic and/or economic losses that arise from
increased congestion), she should be compensated under Fifth
55

See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
See Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
57 See generally United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (noting that
consequential harms from takings are not compensable); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,
441 U.S. 506 (1979) (finding that owners should only be compensated at fair market value of the
property, even though they could not find property to operate their summer camp on for the market
price of the condemned land because the camp was exempt from certain regulations that were costly
to comply with only so long as they operated on the condemned premises). In simple condemnation
cases, federal law does not require compensation for lost goodwill, even though an owner might
have used a parcel with a particular generic market value to operate a particular business that is
more valuable to maintain on that parcel. See Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
Seen in that light, the fact that Cedar Point Nursery arguably might lose more than the typical
owner would lose when mandated to surrender the exclusion right because it intended to use that
right in an atypically, economically valuable way is of no moment. Since I do not find the cases
holding lost goodwill to be non-compensable—whether grounded in the idea that the state does not
gain the goodwill even if the parcel owner loses it, that goodwill may not be lost but recaptured in
a new location, or in the idea that we should avoid inquiries into the subjective reservation prices
of condemnees and stick to more readily measured market values for physically similar parcels in
similar locations—I would not rely as much on this account of the impropriety of accounting for
the losses arising from increased vulnerability to unionization as I suspect many judges would.
56
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Amendment standards.58 When a taking is needed to facilitate the
establishment of a profit-dampening regulatory scheme (as this one is
simply part of a scheme of regulating managerial prerogatives to dampen
potentially pro-union sentiments), the losses that result from the
regulatory scheme should be adjudicated according to a range of
standards we must develop to deal with that regulatory matter. I should
reiterate a point I made earlier in a different context on the state’s need to
“take” property to meet purely regulatory goals because it is germane
here59: Had the government simply seized some of the nursery owner’s
property that the union organizers in fact used and then granted them
access to that condemned land, it would simply have paid for the sliver it
seized (without regard to the potential lost profits that unionization might
cause).60 But that form of property appropriation would not have been
efficacious because it would not have ensured that the organizers had
access to workers if the employer, after the condemnation, kept the
workers physically separated from the spot the state had seized and then
allowed organizers to use. The (non-appropriative) add-on regulation
needed to meet the state’s ends would have forbidden employer
limitations on worker/organizer contact would plainly have been assessed
(in taking terms) under a deferential Penn Central use regulation test and,
more pointedly, be judged as part of a regime regulating union
organizing.
What is the best measure of the Fifth Amendment losses? Professor
Lee Fennell proposes that the taking of what amounts to a rental of a
portion of the land for part of the year for use by the organizers (or
perhaps an easement granting third party access to a relatively small strip
of the nursery’s land) cannot merit more compensation than taking this
rental interest in the same small strip would merit.61 She further notes that
if that is the case, the compensation ought to be relatively trivial: the cost
of the nursery land per acre suggests that the government “took” a
property interest worth no more than five dollars per year.62
Professor Fennell’s general claim—an easement over a strip of land
or a rental of the land cannot be worth more than the interest in that
58 See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (directing lower court on
remand to determine the full range of economic losses arising from the lost legal right to exclude,
including the loss of ability to charge user fees for access, that the owners of a marina-style
subdivision suffered when mandated to permit public use of the pond that the owners had created
through a dredging project).
59 See supra text accompanying note 31.
60 See discussion supra note 57 (compensation is based solely on the fair market value of the
condemned property, where measurable, not the value to the condemnor nor the consequential
damages to the condemnee).
61 Lee Anne Fennell, Escape Room: Implicit Takings after Cedar Point Nursery, 17 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB POL’Y 1, 55 (2022).
62 Id. at 55–56.
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amount of land would be worth—is unconvincing. A hypothetical farmer
might well require much more to sell an easement running right next to
her house, or to rent that particular strip, where access holders would
interfere with her privacy interests, than she would require to sell the
amount of land covered by the easement or rental at the outer edge of her
property. But Professor Fennell is clearly on to something. She is coming
close to stating the same kind of point that I am emphasizing here, albeit
in a way I find less satisfactory: The hypothetical farmer is entitled to
compensation for the grant of an easement or leasehold interest that
exceeds the value of the acreage covered by the grant only because the
taking deprives her of a privacy interest that takings law is in fact suited
to deal with.
There is a counterargument that the owner might make that
Professor Fennell does not adequately attend to.63 One of the reasons
owners want to retain the right to deny access—and one of the reasons
that they would charge more to surrender the right to control access—is
that they want to be able to exclude those (like union organizers) who
will impact their profits more than generic access-seekers would. But, at
core, this misses the point of the California access requirement, which is
simply to help establish a regulatory scheme in which the right to dole
out access in that way is simply not a stick in the bundle of exclusion
rights that the nursery owner retains.
Reconsider the question of whether landlords in Loretto were
entitled to substantial compensation, as Richard Epstein argued, because
after the state mandated cable company access, they could no longer sell
access rights to the cable company.64 But the whole point of mandating
cable company access is to deprive a landlord of the ability to take
advantage of its natural monopoly over access to cable customers in order
to divide profits from cable service with the cable company.65 The state
63 She does attend to the argument to an extent but dismissed the owner’s claim largely by
arguing, as I did more hesitantly supra note 57, that the owner is not entitled to be compensated at
her reservation price to make the particular sale. Fennell, supra note 61, at 57. I am skeptical of the
force of the argument in this case, a case which does not seem to me to turn on whether owners
need be indemnified rather than compensated at fair market value. If the land would, if sold,
typically be sold to other nursery operators who would increase their bids if entitled to exclude
labor organizers, I am skeptical that this is a case in which the particular owner would demand
more than the market price to sell the relevant interest.
64 See discussion supra note 11.
65 Justice Marshall’s description of the New York state statute’s purpose sounds in traditional
accounts of the regulation of monopolistic public utilities: “To facilitate tenant access to CATV,
the State of New York enacted § 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973. Section 828
provides that a landlord may not ‘interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon
his property or premises,’ and may not demand payment from any tenant for permitting CATV, or
demand payment from any CATV company ‘in excess of any amount which the [State Commission
on Cable Television] shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable.’ The landlord may, however,
require the CATV company or the tenant to bear the cost of installation and to indemnify for any
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could certainly have regulated the price at which sales of access occurred,
and this price regulation would be subject to deferential review of
whether the price control itself constituted a taking.66 Because the
competitive price of allowing access to one’s tenants is its zero marginal
cost (and that may well be the optimal price a regulator would set), a
simple price control scheme without an access requirement (i.e.
demanding that there be a contract at some price, which proves to be the
regulated price of zero) is obviously inefficacious: no sales contracts
whose price terms would be subject to deferentially reviewed regulation
would be entered into. But what we also see is that the landlord was not
deprived of the ability to charge a monopoly price because he never had
that power in a reasonable regulatory regime. We should judge whether
the regulatory deprivation of the right to charge a high price that takes
advantage of the natural monopoly is a taking—it is not a close question
under existing law—but we cannot measure the just compensation that is
owed as a result of the per se taking of the exclusion right by noting that
had the taking not occurred, the owner would have exercised his
exclusion right to increase the value of his holdings in ways that he is
simply not entitled to.
CONCLUSION
In reflecting on Cedar Point Nursery, there is a significant, familiar
jurisprudential point to be made. We should read rights purposively.
Plaintiffs can vindicate rights using trespass law only when doing so
would meet the purposes we ascribe to trespass law. Owners merit
compensation under takings law only if doing so meets the purposes we
ascribe to protecting an owner against takings. There is also very practical
point here: We should not measure the compensation that plaintiffs merit
by asking whether they would have sustained fewer economic losses
absent some rights violation. We should look instead to measure only the
losses we seek to avoid by establishing the right.

damage caused by the installation. Pursuant to § 828(1)(b), the State Commission has ruled that a
one-time $1 payment is the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled.” Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423 (1982) (alteration in original).
66 That price controls, like rent controls, are (deferentially) reviewed as legitimate exercises of
the state’s police power rather than as compensable takings was last reaffirmed by the Court in
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1988). The initial Supreme Court case finding that
rent control was not a taking was Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). Other significant Supreme
Court cases reviewing price control laws deferentially include FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480
U.S. 245 (1987) (approving limits on rates charged to cable companies for access to telephone
poles) and Federal Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) (recognizing that federal
regulation of prices in the natural gas market was a legitimate response to the threat of monopoly
pricing). Obviously, Florida Power Corp. is particularly on point.
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What we should learn from Desnick is that the fact that the plaintiff
might not have sustained reputational losses absent a trespass that gave
the trespassers access to reputation-damaging information does not mean
that the damages for trespass should incorporate the damages for
reputational losses. This is particularly vital to note because the
limitations on what damages can and cannot be assessed for reputational
losses given existing defamation doctrine are less protective of the
plaintiff than a rule that gave a trespass plaintiff compensation for all
economic losses facilitated by the trespass would be. Trespass law must
stay in its lane.
We must similarly keep takings law in its lane. In CPN, the fact that
the nursery owners might have had the ability to suppress what they see
as profit-dampening unionization efforts absent the taking does not mean
they are entitled to be compensated for the loss of the ability to suppress
unionization. Just as we must assess reputation-damaging statements
under the law of defamation, we must deal with the validity of laws
limiting the capacity to suppress unionization efforts in their own terms.
What the owners in CPN are entitled to is compensation for the loss of
the rights takings law protects against—in cases like this of temporary
access mandates, losses that inhere in having to share use of a portion of
the property with others. If the owners’ losses are occasioned not by the
taking but solely by their increased vulnerability to unionization, though,
they deserve no compensation at all.

